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Abstract: While contact tracing and case isolation are considered as the first choice of 
interventions against a smallpox bioterrorist event, their effectiveness under vaccination is 
questioned, because not only susceptibility of host and infectiousness of case but also the 
risk of severe clinical manifestations among cases is known to be reduced by vaccine-induced 
immunity, thereby potentially delaying the diagnosis and increasing mobility among 
vaccinated cases. We employed a multi-type stochastic epidemic model, aiming to assess 
the feasibility of contact tracing and case isolation in a partially vaccinated population and 
identify data gaps. We computed four epidemiological outcome measures, i.e., (i) the 
threshold of a major epidemic under the interventions; (ii) the expected total number of 
cases; (iii) the probability of extinction, and (iv) the expected duration of an outbreak, 
demonstrating that all of these outcomes critically depend on the clinical impact of past 
vaccination on the diagnosis and movement of vaccinated cases. We discuss that, even in 
the absence of smallpox in the present day, one should consider the way to empirically 
quantify the delay in case detection and an increase in the frequency of contacts among 
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previously vaccinated cases compared to unvaccinated during the early stage of an 
epidemic so that the feasibility of contact tracing and case isolation in a vaccinated population 
can be explicitly assessed. 
Keywords: symptom; immunization; epidemiology; mathematical model; contact tracing 
 
1. Introduction 
Contact tracing and case isolation constitute a crucial element of non-pharmaceutical interventions 
against directly transmitted infectious diseases including smallpox [1–3]. Our society seeks for these 
countermeasures especially when we do not have any specific pharmaceutical interventions such as 
antiviral treatment and vaccination (or when we do not have substantial stock of the pharmaceutical 
agents to cover a large fraction of susceptible individuals in a population). Because of non-specific 
nature of the interventions, the contact tracing and case isolation have tended to be discussed assuming 
the absence of vaccination in public health contingency plans. 
In the meantime, epidemiological study design and analysis of vaccine effects have greatly progressed 
during the past decades [4]. In addition to classifying epidemiological effects of vaccination into 
relative reductions in susceptibility and infectiousness, the reduced risks of symptomatic illness and 
severe clinical manifestations among vaccinated cases have been quantified using empirical datasets in 
clinical settings. Moreover, epidemiological impact of several different effects of vaccination on the 
reproduction number has been examined [5]. In the present day, one can theoretically predict the likely 
population impact of vaccination by employing a mathematical model, while realistically separating 
vaccine effects into various different types. 
Because of independent progress of the abovementioned two subject areas, we have yet to understand 
how feasible the contact tracing and case isolation would be in the presence of vaccination in a 
population. This issue is motivated by previous epidemiological studies of smallpox [6,7] which 
estimated that previously vaccinated individuals by 1970s are probably not protected from contracting 
smallpox any longer in the present day. However, it was also implicated that the vaccinated individuals 
may still possess partially immunity against severe smallpox and death. The possession of partial 
protection should be good news as a whole for the prevention of smallpox epidemic in the absence of 
other interventions, but the residual immunity could induce unexpected adverse population effects. 
Namely, the residual immunity could mask signs and symptoms of vaccinated smallpox cases, thereby 
delaying the diagnosis or detection of cases, and moreover, the vaccinated cases may be more mobile 
than unvaccinated ones due to mild clinical symptoms [6]. 
We would like to assess if the contact tracing and case isolation, the first choice of interventions 
against smallpox, can remain feasible in a partially immune population. The present study is aimed to 
describe the transmission dynamics that involves contact tracing and case isolation under vaccination 
using a mathematical model, assessing the feasibility and identifying associated data gaps. 
  
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2013, 10 818 
 
 
2. Methods  
2.1. Mathematical Model  
We start with considering the transmission dynamics in a randomly mixing population, although a 
heterogeneous model will be considered later. Let R0 be the basic reproduction number of an infectious 
disease, representing the average number of secondary cases generated by a typical primary case 
throughout the course of its infectiousness in a fully susceptible population [8]. In a common transmission 
dynamics written by ordinary differential equations (e.g., the so-called “Susceptible-Infectious-Removed 
(SIR)” model), R0 may be decomposed as the product of the transmission rate  and the average 
duration of infectiousness 1/. Under contact tracing practice which is accompanied by case isolation, 
we assume that the contact tracing takes place before the traced exposed individuals become infectious 
and that a fraction q of the total contacts of primary case can be traced and are effectively prevented. 
The average number of secondary cases generated by a primary case under the contact tracing  
is thus (1 − q)R0. 
We describe a population in which only a part of them are fully protected from infection due to 
vaccination that took place in advance of an epidemic. Due to the vaccination practice, a fraction vf is 
assumed as fully immune, while a fraction vp is partially immune (e.g., not protected from smallpox 
but protected from the severe illness). Partially immune individuals are assumed to have a reduced 
susceptibility by a factor αs ≤ 1. Even provided that the partially immune individuals are infected, their 
infectiousness is assumed to be αi times that among fully susceptible individuals (where αi ≤ 1).  
The relative reductions in susceptibility and infectiousness are common assumptions [4]. Moreover, 
we assume that vaccination elicits protection from severe disease. Because of the reduced severity, 
cases among partially immune individuals would be more mobile and have a greater contact rate than 
cases arising from susceptible individuals by a factor αm ≥ 1. Lastly, the reduced severity may not only 
improve clinical outcomes but also delay diagnosis, and thus, we assume that the duration of infectious 
contact is lengthened by αd times (where αd ≥ 1). It should be noted that the last two effects, i.e.,  
αm and αd, are vaccine-induced modifications in behavior, and thus, the estimates could vary with 
calendar time, geographic location and during the course of an epidemic (see Discussion).  
For simplicity and for the exposition of our modeling results, we focus on the early stage of an 
epidemic in a single hypothetical setting. In summary, we consider four individual effects of 
vaccination among which two act as protective (i.e., reduce the average number of secondary cases per 
single primary case), while the remaining two factors, αm and αd, can increase the reproduction number 
of partially immune individuals relative to fully susceptible individuals. 
Under the abovementioned scenario, we assess four epidemiological outcome measures, including: 
(i) the threshold of a major epidemic under the interventions (contact tracing/case isolation and 
vaccination); (ii) the probability of extinction given a single vaccinated or unvaccinated index case; 
(iii) the expected number of cases throughout the course of an epidemic, and (iv) the expected duration 
of a minor outbreak. 
To describe the transmission dynamics under vaccination, we employ the next-generation matrix. 
We split the population into two sub-groups by vaccination history and the average number of secondary 
cases in sub-group i generated by a single primary case of sub-group j is denoted by Rij (where the 
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subscripts i and j represent the vaccination history in which vaccinated individuals are denoted by 1 
and otherwise 0). The average numbers of within- and between-group transmissions that are seen 
among those who are capable of causing further cases are parameterized as follows: 
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Namely, among unvaccinated contacts caused by unvaccinated primary cases, the proportion of 
those who do not possess residual immunity (1 − vf − vp) and contact tracing of primary cases (1 − q) 
are multiplied to R0. When the contacts are vaccinated, partially protected population vp has a reduced 
susceptibility by αs times as compared to unvaccinated. When the primary case is vaccinated, the 
transmissibility is multiplied by αiαmαd due to individual effects of vaccination on the primary case as 
mentioned above. Although the reproduction numbers (1) are heuristically described, Rij similar to 
Equation (1) can be derived from a variety of equation systems that adopt the abovementioned 
assumptions. The next-generation matrix, K, is written as: 
00 01
10 11
R R
R R
    K  (2) 
The effective reproduction number, Rv, of a population with vaccine-induced immunity is defined 
as the dominant eigenvalue of the next-generation matrix: 
0(1 )(1 (1 ))v f p s i d mR q v v R        (3) 
For the sake of clarity in our theoretical exposition (to apply model-based findings to the practical 
issue of smallpox control), we focus on the spread of infection that can be expected to be contained in 
the absence of partial immunity. Considering that 30% or more of the present day population has never 
been vaccinated, the assumption of “successful containment” indicates that the contact tracing is 
highly effective in preventing secondary transmission [1] (e.g., the initial attack size should not be too 
large to contain smallpox by means of contact tracing and case isolation). Namely, Rv < 1 for vp = 0,  
or equivalently, (1 − q)(1 − vf)R0 < 1.  
2.2. Epidemic Threshold and Vaccine Effects 
Let nu,i and nv,i be the numbers of unvaccinated and vaccinated cases in generation i, respectively. 
For mathematical convenience, here we focus on the exponential growth (linear phase) alone. Given the 
initial numbers of nu,0 unvaccinated and nv,0 vaccinated index cases, the i-th generation is written as: 
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Κ  (4) 
The total number of unvaccinated and vaccinated cases, Nu and Nv, throughout the course of an 
epidemic is calculated as: 
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Combining Equations (4) and (5), we get: 
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which results from geometric series and converges only in the case of Rv < 1. A major epidemic, which 
does not decline to extinction without substantial depletion of susceptible individuals or concerted 
effort of control, occurs if and only if Rv > 1. Solving the inequality with respect to vaccine effects,  
we obtain the following condition that allows a major epidemic to occur: 
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We assume that an outbreak starts with a single index case. In the sub-critical case (i.e., Rv ≤ 1),  
the total number of cases converges to:  
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If an epidemic starts with a single infected individual who experiences infection at random,  
the probability that the index case is vaccinated is given by vpαs/(1 − vf − vp + vpαs). Otherwise, he/she 
is unvaccinated with the probability (1 − vf − vp)/(1 − vf − vp + vpαs). Using this initial condition,  
the total number of cases who are capable of causing secondary transmissions is: 
,0 ,0
0
1 ( )
1
1
1 (1 )(1 (1 ))
u v u v
v
f p s i d m
N N n n
R
q v v R  
  
     
  
(9) 
It should be noted that Nu + Nv increases if: 
1s i d m     (10) 
Caution must be exercised with respect to the total number of cases that is different from the 
calculation in Equation (9), because the abovementioned model has omitted the cases who were traced 
perfectly and isolated before developing infectiousness. That is, in addition to R00 + R10 in Equation (1), 
each unvaccinated cases have actually infected additional (1 − vf − vp + vpαs)qR0 cases who were 
perfectly traced and were not involved in further transmission dynamics given their own infections. 
Similarly, in addition to R01 + R11 in Equation (1), each vaccinated cases have caused αiαmαd(1 − vf − vp 
+ vpαs)qR0 cases who were traced. Thus, the total number of cases Z is written as: 
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2.3. Probability of Extinction and Vaccine Effects 
Whereas we consider a special case Rv < 1 for vp = 0, a combined vaccine effect that satisfies in 
Equation (7) for vp ≥ 0 can lead to a major epidemic. We thus consider the relationship between the 
probability of extinction and vaccine effects in the following by continuing to employ the 
abovementioned multi-type branching process approximation. 
As adopted above, we label unvaccinated as type 0 and vaccinated as type 1. To ease the computation 
of the probability of extinction, we assume that the infectious period is exponentially distributed so that 
the multi-type branching process model can be rewritten as a multivariate birth-and-death process [9–12]. 
Let γi (i = 0 or 1) be the recovery rate of infectious individuals of type i and βij (0 ≤ i, j ≤ 1) be the rate 
of increase in infectious individuals (i.e., the so-called “birth rate” of birth-and-death process) of type i 
generated by a primary case of type j. Considering a large population that consists of fully susceptible 
individuals, each element of the next-generation matrix is written as Rij = βij/γj.  
Let F be the probability generating function of the multi-type branching process, i.e., 
0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1( , ) ( , ) , 0,1
x x
j j
x
F s s p x x s s j   (12) 
where pj(x) is the probability that an individual of type j causes the x0 unvaccinated and x1 vaccinated 
cases in the next generation. Following our foregoing study [9], we have Fj(s) with an exponentially 
distributed infectious period that permits us to rewrite Equation (12) as: 
1
0
( )
(1 )
j
j
j kk
F
s

 kj
s

    (13) 
for j = 0 or 1. As we have already discussed elsewhere [11,12], Equation (13) is simplified to: 
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Any introduction of initial cases decline to extinction with probability 1 as long as Rv ≤ 1. In the 
case of Rv > 1, the extinction probability by generation t, πt(s) is described by using that at an earlier 
generation t − 1, i.e., 
1
1 ( ) ( ( ))
t tFπ s π u   (15) 
where u represents the initial condition, (nu,0, nv,0) = (0,1) or (1,0). Since we consider a two-host 
population (i.e., unvaccinated and vaccinated cases), the probabilities of extinction at generation t 
given a single unvaccinated, πt(0,1) is given as a solution of the following simultaneous equations: 
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The probability of extinction, π can be obtained by taking the limit of t, which corresponding to: 
( )Fπ π   (17) 
or equivalently:  
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2013, 10 822 
 
 
0
00 0 10 1
1
01 0 11 1
1
1 (1 ) (1 )
1
1 (1 ) (1 )
R R
R R
  
  
    
    
  
(18) 
where π0 and π1 are the probabilities of extinction given one unvaccinated and vaccinated case, 
respectively. As practiced with many other branching process models, each of the secondary cases of 
type i generated by a primary case becomes an ancestor of an independent sub-processes (which 
restarts with a type i individual) behaving identically among the same type i [13]. Because of this 
multiplicative nature, the probability of extinction given multiple index cases (a0, a1) is calculated as: 
1
0
( ) ( ) jj
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The expected duration of an epidemic, E(T) is calculated as: 
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Since the abovementioned descriptions rest on homogeneous mixing assumption between vaccinated 
and unvaccinated individuals, we additionally consider a heterogeneous pattern of transmission, at least 
by assuming that there are more frequent contacts within unvaccinated subpopulation as compared to 
between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. To address the so-called “assortative mixing” (i.e.,  
a type of mixing in which a substantial fraction of contacts are reserved for within-group mixing),  
here we adopt the preferred mixing assumption [14]. Let  be the proportion of contacts that are spent 
for within-group mixing, the element of the next-generation matrix for the heterogeneously mixing 
population is parameterized as: 
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where ai measures the susceptibility of sub-group i, i.e., 
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Similarly, bj measures the infectiousness of primary cases in sub-group j, i.e., 
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ni scales the population size of sub-group i: 
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Note that the parameterization in Equation (21) would result in (1) if  = 0 (i.e., random mixing).  
When  = 1, all transmission occurs within an identical group, and this type of transmission is referred 
to as fully assortative. 
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2.4. Numerical Illustration 
We consider a hypothetical scenario of biological warfare using variola virus. In advance of the 
bioterrorist event, we assume that no one possess full protection against smallpox any longer, and thus, 
vf = 0 [6,15]. On the other hand, we assume that vp = 0.3 or 30% of the population still possesses 
partial protection (nevertheless, it should be noted that the fraction of susceptible individuals would 
continue to increase as time goes by). As mentioned above, our scenario is supposed to be a  
subcritical process in the absence of partial protection [6]. Namely, Rv < 1 for vp = 0. This leads to  
(1 − q)(1 − vf)R0 < 1 (or (1 − q)R0 < 1 due to vf = 0). In the absence of intervention, R0 is crudely 
assumed to be 5 which is in line with the goal of vaccination coverage during the Intensified Smallpox 
Eradication Programme without accounting for other interventions [16] and also with the published 
estimate of 6.85 if accompanied by contact tracing [17,18]. The protective effect of contact tracing,  
q is arbitrarily assumed as 0.8 due to an assumption of sub-critical process (i.e., to adopt an assumption 
of Rv < 1). One should remember that these arbitrarily allocated R0 and q are very influential in 
discussing the feasibility of containment (using Equation (3)). Under these assumptions, we vary the 
combined effect of vaccination, denoted by αsαiαmαd, while we adopt a fixed value of αs at 0.8 given 
that a historical household data with probably limited vaccine potency indicates that susceptibility is 
reduced by a factor of 0.69 [16]. Varying the combined effect of vaccination from 0 to 2, we calculate 
the estimate of the effective reproduction number, the expected total number of cases, the probability 
of extinction, and the expected duration of an outbreak. All statistical data were analyzed using a 
statistical software JMP version 9.0.0 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA). 
3. Results 
3.1. Epidemic Threshold 
The effective reproduction number, Rv, under vaccination and contact tracing/case isolation is computed 
using the assumed numerical values for smallpox and varying the uncertain product, αsαiαmαd, of 
combined effect of vaccination from 0 to 2 (Figure 1(A)). As can be seen from Equation (3),  
the reproduction number is a linear function of the combined vaccine effect. Also, the reproduction 
number leads to be supercritical (i.e., Rv > 1) as long as the inequality in Equation (7) is not satisfied. 
Figure 1(B) shows the total number of cases based on Equations (9) and (11). Due to the use of 
geometric series 1/(1 − Rv) in the expectations, the expected number of cases dramatically increases as 
αsαiαmαd becomes close to 1. When αsαiαmαd is greater than 1 in our hypothetical setting and  
Equation (7) is met, we would have Rv > 1 and a major epidemic could occur. As long as the product 
αsαiαmαd is less than 0.9, the total number of cases is kept below 300, indicating the critical importance 
in quantitatively measuring αsαiαmαd. 
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Figure 1. Epidemic threshold and the total number of cases under vaccination and contact 
tracing. In both panels, the horizontal axis represents the product αsαiαmαd that measures 
the partial effects of vaccination. (A) The effective reproduction number under vaccination 
and contact tracing. (B) The expected total number of cases and the total number of cases 
who are capable of causing secondary transmissions. The basic reproduction number was 
assumed as 5. A fraction q = 0.8 of contacts was assumed to be protected by contact tracing. 
Vaccination was assumed to have conferred no full protection but partial protection among 
30% of the population. Among partially protected individuals, susceptibility was assumed 
to be reduced by a factor of 0.8. 
 
3.2. Multi-Type Branching Process 
The probability of extinction is examined in Figure 2(A) as a function of the combined effect of 
vaccination. As long as αsαiαmαd satisfies inequality in Equation (7), we have Rv ≤ 1, and thus,  
the probability of extinction given a single infected individual is always 1. Otherwise, the extinction 
probability lies between 0 and 1. Under the examined scenario with the relationship R00 + R10 < R01 + R11 
for αiαmαd > 1, an introduction of single vaccinated individual is more risky to cause an epidemic than 
introducing an unvaccinated case into the population. For instance, when αsαiαmαd = 3,  
the probabilities of extinction given an unvaccinated and a vaccinated case are 78.8% and 49.8%, 
respectively. We also examined the impact of assortative (heterogeneous) mixing on the probability of 
extinction given a single unvaccinated index case (Figure 2(B)). As can be intuitively expected, the 
greater the assortativity coefficient is, the greater the probability of extinction would be.  
Figure 3(A) shows the expected duration of outbreak for a subcritical process which is examined as 
a function of the combine effect of vaccination. Since we consider the subcritical process with Rv ≤ 1 
(i.e., there would be only minor outbreaks) or αsαiαmαd ≤ 1, introducing an unvaccinated individual as 
index case would yield a longer duration of an outbreak as compared to introducing a vaccinated case. 
The expected duration of minor outbreak within the assumed parameter space was overall shorter than 
10 generations (i.e., less than 150 days) and was not dramatically extended even when Rv becomes 
closer to a critical level. The impact of heterogeneous mixing on the duration of an outbreak given an 
unvaccinated index case is examined in Figure 3(B).  
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Figure 2. Probability of extinction and combined effect of vaccination. In both panels, the 
horizontal axis represents the product αsαiαmαd that measures the partial effects of 
vaccination. (A) Probability of extinction given a single infected individual is compared  
by vaccination history of the index case. Random mixing assumption was adopted.  
(B) Probability of extinction given a single unvaccinated index case with different assortativity 
coefficient values.  
 
Figure 3. Expected duration of minor outbreak under vaccination. In both panels, the 
horizontal axis represents the product αsαiαmαd that measures the partial effects of vaccination. 
(A) Expected duration of outbreak given a single infected individual is compared by 
vaccination history of the index case. Random mixing assumption was adopted. (B) Expected 
duration of outbreak given a single unvaccinated index case with different values of 
assortativity coefficient.  
 
For each combined effect of vaccination, the effective reproduction number with different assortativity 
coefficient was kept identical to allow comparisons. The basic reproduction number was assumed as 5.  
A fraction q = 0.8 of contacts was assumed to be protected by contact tracing. Vaccination was assumed to have 
conferred no full protection but partial protection among 30% of the population. Among partially protected 
individuals, susceptibility was assumed to be reduced by a factor of 0.8. Note that vertical axis of Figure 3 is 
expressed in generations of infection (the mean per generation is about 15 days). 
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Since an unvaccinated case is introduced, lower assortativity leads to observe longer durations of 
outbreak for αsαiαmαd > 0.5. However, the advantage of low assortativity is diminished as αsαiαmαd 
becomes smaller (i.e., as the combined vaccine effect becomes larger). 
4. Discussion 
The present study modeled the transmission dynamics of an infectious disease, considering 
smallpox for the exposition and examining the contact tracing and case isolation in a partially immune 
population. Four different vaccine effects were considered, and especially, we took into account two 
specific effects that would adversely work for the epidemic control, i.e., the delay in detecting cases 
and increase in mobility among vaccinated cases. In some unfavorable scenarios, we have shown that 
the negative impact of vaccination on disease control can lead to observing worse epidemic outcomes 
than the contact tracing and case isolation in the absence of vaccination. Thus, using a linear model 
written as a multi-type branching process approximation, the threshold of a major epidemic, the total 
number of cases, the probability of extinction and the duration of an outbreak were computed as a 
function of the total vaccine effects. We have demonstrated that all four epidemiological outcomes are 
greatly influenced by the assumed values of the combined effect of vaccination, which could partly 
lead to questioning the feasibility of successful containment of smallpox by means of contact tracing 
and case isolation. Nevertheless, such vaccination effects have yet to be empirically estimated. 
Our study is the first to identify the associated data gap that would influence the feasibility of 
implementing contact tracing and case isolation in the event of a bioterrorist attack or any other 
opportunities (e.g., containment phase of a pandemic influenza). Among four different effects,  
the delay in detecting cases and an increase in the frequency of movement are two critical variables 
that must be measured urgently and compared between vaccinated and unvaccinated cases. 
Nevertheless, at a clinical setting, the relative difficulty in clinical diagnosis of vaccinated cases as 
compared with unvaccinated has not been routinely measured as one of biological effects of 
vaccination. Moreover, although there have been published studies that showed the reduced frequency 
of contact during symptomatic period (as compared with during the incubation period) [19],  
the frequency of contact (or the frequency of physical movement) has not been compared between 
vaccinated and unvaccinated cases. More importantly, two effects, i.e., αm and αd, are associated with 
behavioral aspect, and thus, it is likely that the estimates would not be regarded as biological constants, 
and rather, could vary with time and space. The estimates can also greatly vary with the recognition of 
a bioterrorist attack during the course of an epidemic. Although we have focused on the early stage of 
an epidemic in a single hypothetical setting and fixed these parameters as if these were constants, such 
assumptions may be subject to explicit evaluation. 
To quantitatively measure these two effects (by assuming that these two are constants during the 
early stage of an epidemic), there would be two practical difficulties in the empirical observations. 
First, we do not have a widely accepted scale in measuring both vaccine effects in the way that directly 
influences the transmission dynamics (or the next-generation matrix). Second, smallpox has already 
been eradicated and our society does not have an opportunity to conduct any further empirical 
observations of naturally infected individuals. As a potential solution, one could consider gathering 
expert opinion [20] among those who experienced smallpox control or clinical management of 
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smallpox cases. In fact, the effectiveness of post-exposure vaccination against smallpox has been 
explored based on a Delphi survey among experts [21]. Another possible solution is to use video or 
other pictorial materials that permit medical experts to judge the diagnoses of patients under 
hypothetical scenarios. Even a quick clinical diagnosis using photographs of smallpox patients is 
useful for training purpose among physicians in the present day (and such photographs can act as a 
precious learning material). In such an instance, the success probability of correct diagnosis of 
smallpox in vaccinated individuals (e.g., as compared to unvaccinated cases) may be used as a 
complimentary parameter that describes the vaccine-induced delay in diagnosis. On the other hand, we 
missed opportunities to directly measure the reduced mobility of vaccinated smallpox cases in humans. 
As complimentary information, the differential mobility between vaccinated and unvaccinated cases of 
other similar viral diseases (e.g., measles, chickenpox and rubella) may be studied. 
Three technical limitations must be noted briefly. First, our model has been kept simple, and the 
realism has remained small. Our framework can be extended to realistic scenarios including the 
dynamics on a heterogeneous network [22–25], and future modeling studies should address this point. 
Second, the above discussed vaccine effects have not been supported by empirical data. Moreover, 
other vaccine effects (i.e., other than the delay in diagnosis and increased mobility) may well have 
been missed. Third, not only the combined vaccine effect, but also the actual immunity levels, i.e.,  
vf and vp, remain unknown in many epidemiological settings. Without understanding the background 
immunity levels, it is difficult to directly quantify the epidemic threshold using empirical data [26]. 
Although we have multiple tasks to be completed, we believe that the present study has contributed 
much to literature by identifying the associated data gaps in exploring the feasibility of contact tracing 
and case isolation under vaccination practice [25,27]. Employing various empirical approaches,  
the epidemiological adverse effects of vaccination should be statistically estimated in the future. 
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